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Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum
Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes*

Abstract. The laws of war forbid states to use force against each other except in selfdefense or with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. Self-defense is
usually understood to mean self-defense against an imminent threat. We model the
decision of states to use force against “rogue” states, and argue that under certain
conditions it may be proper to expand the self-defense exception to preemptive selfdefense. We also consider related issues such as humanitarian intervention, collective
security, and the role of the Security Council.

In the last fifteen years, the United States has launched military interventions in
Panama (1989), Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993), Kosovo (1997), and Iraq (2003) again. In
theory, these wars, and many others involving other states during this period, are
governed by international law. However, the “use of force” rules of international law, jus
ad bellum, have frequently been disregarded.1
The use of force rules are straightforward. Under the United Nations charter,
states may use force against other states only under two conditions. First, a state may use
force if authorized to do so by the United Nations Security Council. Because the United
Nations Security Council can act only if the five permanent members – the United States,
Russia, Britain, France, and China – agree, however, and because these five members
rarely agree on anything, the Security Council has authorized war only twice, the first
time (Korea) because of a tactical error by the Soviet Union in failing to exercise its veto.
Second, a state may use force in self-defense. Self-defense is understood in the
narrowest terms: the state using force must either be under attack or under threat of
“imminent” attack.2 And even when there is a threat or incursion, the state invoking the
right of self-defense must exercise restraint and use only “proportionate” force to counter
the attack. It cannot use a small border incursion as an excuse for launching a full-scale
invasion.
*

Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law and Frank and Bernice Greenberg Professor of Law, University of
Chicago.
1
As argued by Michael J. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power: Interventionism After
Kosovo (2001); see also Mark Weisburd, Use of Force: The Practice of States Since World War II (1997),
who takes an intermediate position; for the contrary view, see Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State
Action against Threats and Armed Attacks (2002).
2
For a discussion, see Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense 165-90 (3d ed. 2001).

Because the United Nations Security Council so rarely authorizes wars, and
because self-defense cannot be invoked by both sides to a dispute, there should be few
legal wars. Yet, there have been dozens of wars among states that have ratified the
United Nations charter. When states routinely violate international law, it becomes clear
that the law must evolve if it is to remain relevant at all. The question for us is what
should happen to the use of force rules?
Today, we can see three possible answers to this question. The first is a reversion
to the nineteenth century system, which, according to most contemporary authorities,
placed no restrictions on the use of force.3 The second is a reassertion of the United
Nations system, perhaps with some modifications. European condemnation of the
American led invasion of Iraq in 2003 reflects such an effort to preserve the United
Nations system. The third is the evolution of a wholly new system or new exceptions to
the United Nations system. One frequently discussed possibility is that states will acquire
legal authority to launch preemptive invasions in response to long-term (that is, non“imminent”) threats and to immediate humanitarian crises.4 The purpose of this paper is
to evaluate these options from a rational choice perspective.
At the outset, we should make clear that we focus narrowly on the rules governing
the use of force (jus ad bellum), and not on the laws of war or humanitarian law (jus in
bello), which is the body of law governing the weapons and tactics used within a war (the
treatment of POWs, and so forth).5 Both bodies of law are sometimes confusingly placed
under the rubric of the “laws of war.” Our focus is further confined to the use of force
against “rogue” states, and for the purpose of humanitarian intervention. We will say
more about these limitations in Section II.
In addition, our focus is normative, not positive. We seek to determine whether
existing or alternative use of force rules are sound. A political science literature focuses
L. Oppenheim, 2 International Law: A Treatise 178 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). The just war
tradition, though advanced by international lawyers such as Grotius, is best understood as a moral rather
than legal tradition, as it was never reflected in state practice.
4
Britain’s foreign minister Jack Straw suggested that the United Nations charter be amended to allow
for these exceptions; more recently, he has argued that the exceptions will have to evolve as customary
exceptions. See Straw: War Won’t Change UN Charter, The Guardian Online, March 30, 2004, available
at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,1182177,00.html.
5
For an economic approach to jus in bello, see Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 297 (2003).
3
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on positive issues such as the conditions under which states go to war.6 Although we will
refer to that literature, our effort is distinct from it.
Finally, we should mention that there is a large international law literature on use
of force, but this literature is mainly historical, doctrinal, or philosophical.7 Our reliance
on economic analysis is, as far as we know, novel.8
I. International Rules on the Use of Force
The international law on the use of force has two sources: customary international
law and the United Nations charter, which nearly every state has ratified.9 Under the
United Nations charter, states may go to war under only two conditions: with the
authorization of the United Nations Security Council and in self-defense.10 The United
Nations Security Council consists of thirteen states: five permanent members (the United
States, Russia, China, France, and Britain) and eight rotating members. The Security
Council can act only if nine members consent and none of the permanent members
refuses consent. The Security Council was charged with the task of enforcing the United
Nations charter, including the provisions guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all member states. But it has not discharged this function reliably. The United
Nations has authorized the use of force only twice: against North Korea in 1950 after the
USSR boycotted the Security Council in protest of China’s exclusion at the time (a
mistake that has not been repeated); and against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1991.
During this period, there have been dozens or even hundreds of wars, depending on how
one defines the term, and in each case aside from the two just noted the United Nations
Security Council has failed to act.11 It has also never used its greatest power, which is to
compel (rather than merely authorize) its members to come to the defense of a state that
has been invaded.
6

See, e.g., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International
Imperatives (1992).
7
E.g., Dinstein, supra note __; Anthony Clark Arend & Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use
of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm (1993); Christine Gray, Re-Leashing the Dogs of War:
International Law and the Use of Force (2000).
8
However, Yoo applies a cost-benefit test to the self-defense rule. See John C. Yoo, Using Force, 71
U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004). We comment on his argument below.
9
For detailed discussions of the law, see Ingrid Detter, The Law of War (2d ed. 2000), and Yoram
Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defence (3d ed. 2001).
10
United Nations Charter, arts. 2(4) (general prohibition on use of force), 42 (Security Council’s power
to authorize use of force), 51 (right of self-defense).
11
See Glennon, supra note __. Occasionally, it issues bromides; during the Falklands War it
acknowledged that a state of war existed without condemning either side for starting it.
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According to many scholars, the self-defense provision of the United Nations
charter incorporates customary international law, which limits self-defense to uses of
force against an “imminent” threat of attack, and then only a “proportionate” response is
permitted.12 “Preemptive” self-defense, which refers to cases where the threat is more
remote, is forbidden. However, this form of self-defense was not prohibited by customary
international law. Indeed, under customary international law the decision to go to war
was unregulated. The narrower definition of self-defense emanates from a rule of
customary international law that governed uses of force short of war – such as a border
incursion between two nations otherwise at peace. Many scholars hold that the United
Nations charter prohibits preemptive self-defense by incorporating this narrower rule,
known as the Webster-Ashburton rule, after its authors.13
We note that the right of self-defense apparently encompasses the members of
defense alliances—all members may legally use force when one of them is attacked if the
alliance requires it or if one of its members requests aid. Likewise, states may legally
come to the aid of a belligerent state that requests aid even outside the framework of an
alliance.
Finally, in recent years some scholars have claimed that states may use force in
order to prevent intrastate humanitarian disasters such as a government’s use of force
against its own people.14 The United Nations charter has no such provision, but the
United States and several European countries launched air attacks on Serbia in 1999 in
order to stop human rights abuses against ethnic Albanians living in the Serbian province
of Kosovo. As the United Nations Security Council did not authorize the invasion, and as
it was clearly not an exercise of collective self-defense (which applies only to states, not
intrastate political units that are attacked), either this use of force was illegal, or else it
established legal precedent for the use of force against governments that abuse their own
people.
A few scholars have argued that the use of force rules in the United Nations
charter no longer have the force of law.15 They point out that dozens of wars have been
12

See Dinstein, supra note __, at 165-69, 208-13.
Id., at 219-21. As Dinstein notes, this view is not universally accepted; some scholars deny that
customary international law is incorporated in the UN charter.
14
See, e.g., Fernando Tesón, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in Humanitarian
Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003).
15
See supra note __.
13
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started by United Nations member states, that only two were authorized by the United
Nations Security Council, and that the self-defense provision, by definition, cannot be
invoked by both sides of a conflict. Efforts to find new customary rules, such as the
humanitarian intervention exception, fail as well because states do not act consistently:
states go to war for political reasons, as they did before the United Nations charter was
ratified.
We take no position on this debate. We simply assume arguendo that (some)
states care, at least a little, about their reputation for complying with international law, so
that the law will affect their behavior on the margin. We then ask what are the optimal
rules regarding the use of force under this assumption.
II.

Theoretical Considerations: The Private and Social Value of the Use of Force

In the discussion to follow, we limit our treatment of the use of force to cases
involving self-defense or defense of others (humanitarian intervention). In particular, we
assume that some external actor poses a threat of pure aggression (that is, aggression not
motivated by defense of self or others) against the actor that we model, or against third
persons that the actor we model may wish to defend. If the aggression occurs, we further
assume that it is socially undesirable and will impose net social costs. The threat of
aggression is exogenous in that our model does not explain why it arises, although we do
entertain the question of whether the aggressor can be deterred through various means. It
bears emphasis, however, that we rule out by assumption any possibility that the
aggressor is engaged in productive activity through aggression or the threat of
aggression. The aggressor in our framework is thus much akin to a criminal in the
economics of crime literature, in which it is commonly assumed that the criminal's gains
from a criminal act are smaller than the social costs of the act, making the act undesirable
and posing the problem of how to design an optimal system of deterrence. Our analysis is
very much in the spirit of that literature.
We thus analyze only a subset of the situations in which force may be used or
contemplated. Historically, many wars or threatened wars have occurred between
civilized states that dispute territorial rights, between colonial powers and their colonies
seeking independence, and in various other contexts in which it is difficult to analogize a
potential aggressor state to a criminal actor engaged in strictly unproductive activity. We
do not purport to offer a framework for thinking about all such conflicts, and limit

5

ourselves here to the task of policing what might be termed "rogue" states. We stipulate
that what constitutes a "rogue" state is to some degree in the eye of the beholder, but our
analysis presupposes that such states can be identified in a principled manner.
A. Why Use Force Against Aggressor States?
The analogy between criminals and aggressor states in our framework affords a
useful point of departure for assessing the rules about the use of force. In the economic
literature on crime,16 the use of force plays at most a background role in the design of an
optimal deterrence system. The literature emphasizes the virtue of monetary sanctions
where they will suffice because of their cheapness, and suggests that more costly
sanctions such as incarceration should be employed only when monetary sanctions are
inadequate for deterrence (because, inter alia, of the insolvency problem). The literature
on crime is not concerned exclusively with deterrence, of course, but also emphasizes the
possible value of incapacitation. Here, too, incarceration is the device generally
considered for this purpose. The use of force against criminals (beyond incarceration) is
not discussed in most of the literature (aside from that on capital punishment), although it
assuredly has an implicit role in providing the state with the ability to coerce criminals to
accept sanctions such as fines or imprisonment.17
Against this backdrop, consider the problem of how to deter (or incapacitate) an
aggressor state. The notion in the economic literature on crime that monetary penalties
are the preferred line of defense against socially unproductive acts is obviously flawed in
this context. Just as with criminals, the aggressor state may well lack the assets to pay for
the harms caused by aggression. And unlike the situation with criminals, the individual
actors that lead their state to engage in aggression may bear few if any of the costs of any
monetary penalties that might be imposed. Finally, and most fundamental, why would the
aggressor state pay any such penalties unless a credible threat of force were brought to
bear against it? We do see states required to pay reparations at times, but usually only
after they have lost a war. Occasional exceptions arise when an aggressor state has assets
abroad that can be seized (recall Iran18), but these cases will be uncommon and even then

16

See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
See Steven Levitt, Incentive Compatibility Constraints as an Explanation for the Use of Prison
Sentences Instead of Fines, 17 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 170 (1997).
18
United States of American v. Iran, 1979 I.C.J. 7.
17
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may have little deterrent value on the leaders of aggressor states who do not own the
assets personally.
If conventional monetary penalties are not a realistic penalty for most aggressor
states, however, perhaps other forms of international economic sanctions can be
employed. Sanctions have been used extensively in the international system, not only
against aggressors (such as Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait) but also on humanitarian
grounds (South Africa). Their record, however, is mixed at best. The costs of sanctions
are often borne by the citizenry at large rather than by the leaders whose behavior is the
source of the problem, and leaders often will not give up power voluntarily or make an
important change in their behavior merely to avoid the economic harm that sanctions
bring upon their economies.19
The next line of defense against domestic crime—incarceration and associated
incapacitation—is also of limited utility against aggressor states. To be sure, the leaders
of such states can be and sometimes are incarcerated. But again, this outcome usually
follows a war or a fortuitous regime change that makes it possible for the leaders of
aggressor states to be placed under international criminal jurisdiction. Without the use of
force or at least a credible threat of it, the leaders of aggressor states will usually fear
little from the prospect of war crimes trials and related punishment mechanisms.
For these reasons, the use of force, or at least a credible threat of force, will often
be essential to deter potential aggressor states from unproductive acts or to incapacitate
those states which cannot be deterred. The alternative deterrence mechanisms that we
take for granted in a domestic criminal justice system simply will not work for the most
part in international relations.
To say that force or threat thereof is generally essential, however, says nothing
about the timing of force. As we note in the introduction, the current controversy over the
rules of jus ad bellum centers on the existing constraints on the use of force—the
requirement of Security Council authorization, or of grounds to invoke the right of selfdefense against an actual or imminent attack. Much of our focus in the remaining
19
A classic study of the efficacy of economic sanctions is Gary C. Hufbauer, John J. Schott &
Kimberley Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy 2d Ed. (1990). The
theoretical and empirical literature on sanctions is surveyed in Jonathan Eaton & Alan O. Sykes,
International Sanctions, in Peter Newman ed., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law
Vol. II (1998).
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sections will be on the question whether force can be justified under other circumstances
as well.
B. The Timing of Force: Preemptive Attack
For the moment, we put aside the role of the Security Council as well as the use
of force for humanitarian purposes, and focus on the imminence requirement for the use
of force in self defense. Is the right to use force only against actual or imminent attack
sufficient for purposes of self defense against potential aggressor states?
One answer is that the target of aggression may be a weak state with insufficient
capacity to deter or incapacitate. This problem may be quite real, to be sure, but it does
not argue for relaxing the imminence requirement in general. The state that is weak when
attack is imminent will generally be weak at earlier points in time as well. The solution
here, if there is one, may be for the weaker state to seek a defense alliance with more
powerful states.
If we restrict our attention to potential targets of aggression that have the power to
retaliate with enough force to deter or incapacitate aggressors, there are several obvious
virtues to a requirement that they wait until an attack is underway or at least imminent
before using force in response. Such a rule (if obeyed) ensures that force is only used as a
last resort, and that all diplomatic means (presumably much less costly) to avoid conflict
have been exhausted before force is employed. Likewise, if force is used before an attack
is imminent, a significant chance of mistake may arise—perhaps the potential aggressor
state never would have attacked at all. One must also worry that a right to use force prior
to an imminent attack would be invoked opportunistically, and become a pretense for
aggression instead of a bona fide act of self defense.
More fundamentally, if the potential victim state has substantial capacity to
retaliate against the aggressor, why is it not sufficient for a such a state to threaten
retaliation against an actual attack at a level which will eliminate any gains to the
aggressor state and discourage attack altogether? Such a strategy, if feasible and
successful, eliminates the need for the use of force altogether. This was the essential
strategy of the United States during the Cold War, of course, when "mutually assured
destruction" made it difficult to imagine that a rational Soviet leader would launch a
nuclear attack.

8

These considerations have considerable persuasive force, and perhaps afford a
basis for the imminence requirement across broad classes of self-defense scenarios. We
suggest that they are not conclusive in all cases, however, for at least two types of
reasons.
First, threats of substantial retaliation following an attack may not be credible—
the leaders of aggressor states may realize that should they attack, retaliation will be
constrained by the rational self interest of the state that has been attacked. For example,
retaliation may kill or injure innocent individuals in the aggressor state or neighboring
states. Both geopolitical and moral limitations on the acceptable degree of such damage
may be present, which may seriously undermine the credibility of the retaliatory threat.
Similarly, the behavior that requires deterrence may not be an "attack" per se but a
dangerous and threatening policy, such as the development of nuclear weapons by a
rogue state. The threat to retaliate against a state that develops such weapons may lack
credibility not only because the weapons have not yet been used and political constraints
preclude retaliation, but because the costs of conflict with a nuclear state have risen to
unacceptable levels. Finally, an attack by an aggressor state may not be easily traceable
to that state. An aggressor that operates surreptitiously by supplying dangerous weaponry
to terrorist agents may have plausible capacity to deny responsibility for an attack, and
may believe that retaliation is then unlikely given the great collateral damage that it
would entail.
Second, even where the threat to retaliate is credible, it may not be effective to
deter the leaders of aggressor states. Those leaders may care little about their own
citizens, and may expect to escape the consequences of retaliation themselves. In extreme
cases, they may not even care about their own safety. Consider the religious zealots who
believe that death during war against enemies will bring them to a blissful existence.
Where deterrence is unrealistic for such reasons, the emphasis shifts to incapacitation—to
preventing attacks before they occur. Such a policy inevitably requires the use of force
before an attack is underway or imminent.
These observations afford some reason to worry that an imminence requirement
may not suit all cases terribly well. In the next section, we provide some simple formal
structure to crystallize this concern.

9

C. Preemptive Attack in a Two-Period Model
Consider a two-period scenario involving two countries, Home and Foreign. In
period one, Home is uncertain whether Foreign intends to "attack" in period two. One can
think of an "attack" in literal terms, or simply as an aggressive strategy by Foreign such
as the development of nuclear weapons. Home's subjective probability of such an attack
is p, 0<p<1. Both nations have a per period discount rate of d. For notational
convenience, let δ=1/(1+d).
We further assume that attack by Foreign cannot be deterred by a threat of
retaliation after an attack occurs for one of the reasons given above. One might imagine
the model applying, for example, to a scenario where Foreign has private information
about its type. The “bad” type of Foreign state is one governed by crusaders, religious
zealots, or ideologues who will launch an attack against Home, regardless of whether
Home will retaliate. The “good” type of Foreign state will not attack in period 2. Only
Foreign knows whether it belongs to the bad or good type, and it cannot credibly reveal
its type (bad types are able to "pool" with good types).
Home can attack Foreign preemptively in period one, and eliminate the possibility
of attack in period two. The cost of the preemptive attack to home is Kh, and to Foreign
the cost is Kf. Alternatively, Home can wait until period two when the existence or
nonexistence of the threat from Foreign will be revealed. If Foreign does not attack, no
losses occur and military action is unnecessary then or in the future—the costs of conflict
are zero. If Foreign attacks, however, Home will incur a variety of possible costs. It may
feel obliged to retaliate, and may wish to incapacitate Foreign to prevent future attacks. It
may also feel obliged to incur sizable defense expenditures to guard against the new
threat from Foreign, or may be forced to transfer resources to Foreign to appease it. The
cost to Home in the event of an attack in period two, including damage done to it by the
attack and the cost of its response, will be Yh. The cost to Foreign in the event of conflict
in period two will be Yf.20

20

We proceed in the text on the assumption that the "costs" to Foreign are positive, so that the net
impact of attack on Foreign is not a benefit to it. One could relax this assumption. For example, if one
believed that an attack on Foreign would free its people from miserable repression, it is conceivable that
the net impact of an attack in either period would be favorable and that Kf and Yf are both negative. In a
footnote we briefly touch on the implications of the case where Foreign benefits from an attack, and
consider that possibility more concretely below when we discuss humanitarian intervention.
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Think of Kf and Yf as the welfare costs to Foreign that "count" in a proper social
welfare calculus. If we thought of states as persons, it might be difficult to understand
why these variables should be counted at all in social welfare. In the economic analysis
of criminal law, for example, we often do not count the utility of the criminal, only that
of the victim, and design the law to deter the criminal rather than to maximize the joint
utility of criminal and victim.21 But in international conflict, much destruction can occur
of the life and property of civilians and even of soldiers who are "just following orders."
Without taking any definitive position on which of these costs should "count" and which
should not, we assume that some of them may count and include them in the model. In
the discussion below the included costs to Foreign are termed the "collateral damage."
In limiting the game to two periods, we are obviously simplifying the analysis in
relation to the open-ended time horizon that nations confront in reality. Indeed, if the
world really "ended" in period two, there might well be no reason for Home to incur the
costs of responding to an attack by Foreign as there would be no future periods in which
to derive any benefit. Our assumption that Home will incur the costs of a response in
period two thus is best understood as a abstraction from an environment in which the
game does not really end, and in which Home's best response after Foreign reveals itself
to be aggressive is costly.
Home's private calculus. We make the stylized assumption that Home gives no
weight to the collateral damage to Foreign (even though in practice such costs may
receive some significant weight). Then, Home will attack preemptively if:
Kh < δpYh
This expression implies that Home will find preemptive attack privately optimal if the
costs to home of an attack in period one are less than the discounted expected costs of
conflict in period two. Trivially, preemptive attack is more likely to be optimal when the
costs of preemptive attack (Kh) are smaller, the probability of the threat materializing in
period two (p) is greater, the costs of conflict in period two (Yh) are greater, and the
discount factor (δ) is greater (the discount rate d is smaller).
21

See generally Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, 245, 540-68 (2004). The
notion that certainly utility is illicit and should not count in the social welfare calculus may also be found in
the literature on punitive damages. See Robert Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 So.
Cal. L. Rev. 79 (1982).
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A further obvious implication is that preemptive attack is never optimal unless Yh
> Kh. That is, there can be no gains from preemptive attack unless the costs of conflict
are greater if Home waits. Were it otherwise, Home would benefit by deferring the
conflict due to the time value of money and to the fact that the probability of actual attack
is less than one.
Social calculus. Preemptive action is socially justified (that is, it lowers the
expected social costs of conflict) if:
Kh + Kf < δp(Yh+Yf)
This expression states simply that preemptive attack in period one is justified if the costs
of such an attack (including the collateral damage to Foreign) are less than the discounted
expected costs of conflict in period two (again including collateral damage to Foreign).
It is perhaps useful to rewrite the expression as follows:
(Kh+Kf)/δ(Yh+Yf) < p
Preemptive attack is socially justified if the probability of an attack by Foreign in period
two exceeds the ratio of the costs of preemptive conflict in period one to the discounted
costs of conflict in period two. As with the private calculus, preemptive attack cannot
possibly be justified unless the costs of conflict are growing over time [Kh+Kf < Yh+Yf].
The rate of growth in these costs required to justify preemptive attack is greater, the
smaller is the discount factor δ and the smaller is the probability of attack p. Likewise,
preemptive attack is more likely to be justified as p rises, a point that loosely provides
some basis for the imminence standard (where p presumably approaches 1.0). But a value
of p close to unity is by no means necessary for preemptive attack to be justified in this
framework.
Yet another way to understand these conclusions is to note that delay in the use of
force has value as a real option.22 The option value of delay relates to the time value of
money, but also to the fact that information becomes better over time. In our simple
22

The literature on real options theory is vast. A thoughtful introduction to much of it may be found in
Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty (1994).
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model, Home learns with certainty whether Foreign has aggressive intentions in period
two, but the framework is much more general and can be accommodated to any
assumptions about the way that information improves over time. In general, preemptive
attack will be justified only if the growth in the costs of conflict over time is fast enough
that the option value of delay turns negative.23 Both the private calculus and the social
calculus above may be interpreted in this fashion.
Plainly, there is a divergence between the private and social expressions for the
optimality of preemptive measures. If Home follows its private calculus, and Kf is large
enough, then Home may launch a preemptive attack that is socially suboptimal. But
Home's reliance on its private calculus may also lead it to eschew preemptive attack
when it is socially optimal.24
As an illustration, suppose that the United States is considering a preemptive
attack on Iraq. If Kh is very small (the “cakewalk” theory), and δpYh is large (the WMD
theory), then the United States may launch the attack even if many Iraqi soldiers and
civilians will be harmed (Kf is large), and the attack may fail the social cost-benefit test
for that reason. The United States will also not take account of the of harm to Iraqi
civilians from a retaliatory attack should WMDs be used in period 2 (Yf). Alternatively,
consider again a decision about an invasion of Iraq, but assume now that Kh is relatively
high (say, $100 billion) and δpYh is low (the probability of WMDs is small), so the
United States does not launch an attack. But if Kf is relatively low (because of precision
bombing, few Iraqis are harmed) and Yf is extremely high (if there are WMDs, and they
are used, the United States would retaliate with a massive nuclear strike), then it may be
socially optimal for the United States to attack preemptively. Thus, the divergence

23

Suppose, for example, that the costs of conflict are constant over time: Kh+Kf = Yh+Yf. From a
social standpoint, the option value of delaying the use of force is then equal to (1-δp)(Kh + Kf), an amount
which is clearly positive and which increases as the discount factor and the probability of attack decrease.
24
A further source of potential distortion outside the model relates to the fact that Home may not even
pursue its own interest systematically. There is perhaps no more reason to suppose that governments
maximize national welfare in the pursuit of their security policies than in other policy spheres (such as
international trade), where it is well known that policy decisions routinely diverge from the national
welfare optimum. Eisenhower's now famous warning about the "military-industrial complex" can be taken
as a suggestion that interest groups favoring more militaristic policies may be particularly well organized,
and may thus lead states to devote more resources to defense activities than may be justified on national
welfare grounds.
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between private incentives and social welfare could lead to too many or too few
preemptive attacks.25
D. Extension to Three Periods
The two-period structure above masks some interesting issues, including one
raised by the debate over the invasion of Iraq. European opponents of the invasion, such
as France, proposed to increase the number of weapons inspectors as an alternative to
military action. The proposal for increased inspections, and for a delay in action pending
the conclusion of inspections, suggests an extension of our model to focus on three
stylized points in time when military action might be taken by Home against Foreign: (1)
before the weapons inspections run their course; (2) after their completion but before an
"attack" by Foreign; and (3) after an "attack" by Foreign. We will spare the reader a
complete formal treatment of this case, and simply note the factors that bear on the
wisdom of delay from period one to period two.
Suppose, for concreteness, that preemptive attack is optimal (privately or socially)
if we ignore the intermediate period—the costs of conflict in period one are less than the
discounted expected costs of conflict in period three. When is it nevertheless desirable to
defer military action to period two? The answer relates to considerations noted above.
Plainly, deferring action is more attractive, the higher the discount rate. And it is less
attractive, the faster the costs of conflict are growing over time. The other important
factor is the degree to which information may be expected to improve between period
one and period two. If the estimate of the probability of attack is likely to improve
substantially by waiting, the option value increases, other things being equal. If the likely
improvement in information is minimal, the option value of delay is lower and may well
be negative.
There are many ways that one might model the change in information as a formal
matter, and we offer one possibility here merely as an illustration of the basic idea.
Suppose that at the end of period two (at the end of "weapons inspections"), the
25

We take no position on the actual values of these variables, and on whether the U.S. led invasion of
Iraq was either privately or socially beneficial.
We do note, however, that an important caveat to our analytic discussion arises if one assumes that an
attack on Foreign confers net benefits on it (as by eliminating a repressive regime). Then, one must ask
whether attack is justified from a social standpoint even if Foreign turns out not to be aggressive. That is,
one must modify the social calculus to consider the costs of not attacking Foreign in either period.
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probability of attack will be refined as follows: with probability 0.5, the revised
probability of attack will be p+ε, and with probability 0.5, it will be p-ε. If ε is "large,"
one might say that information has improved considerably. If it is very small, information
has improved little, and in the limit (ε=0), information has not changed.
In this framework, the following points should be intuitively clear. If the costs of
conflict in period one are lower than the expected discounted costs in period three, if ε is
very small, and if the costs of conflict are rising significantly between period one and
period two (the "bad" type Foreign will make significant progress in building up its
armaments, for example), then it probably does not pay to defer military action to period
two. Waiting increases the costs of conflict significantly (if Foreign is indeed a would-be
aggressor state), and waiting will not materially affect the apparent likelihood of whether
Foreign is an aggressor state or not. It is better to act preemptively in period one because
of the greater expected costs of conflict in period two (when a more expensive
preemptive attack will be needed, unless of course the costs have risen so much that it is
then best to wait for period three). By contrast, as ε becomes large, the attractiveness of
delay increases, other things being equal. Delay offers a significant (50%) chance that
information will come to light that considerably reduces (because of the large ε) the
apparent likelihood of Foreign being an aggressor state, and if so all sides may be spared
the costs of military conflict.
The debate between the United States and European opponents of the Iraq
invasion can readily be restated in this framework. The position of the United States was
that weapons inspections were largely useless and would not yield valuable new
information with any significant likelihood. Meanwhile, Iraq could be adding to its
suspected stockpile of WMDs or perhaps sharing them with terrorist organizations, so
that the expected costs of conflict were rising quickly. The European view was that the
weapons inspection process could add significant new information (positive or negative)
about Iraq's intentions. Perhaps further, with enhanced inspections Iraq could not be
expected to make much progress in stockpiling weapons (it would spend all its energy
trying to hide the existing ones if there were any), and the likelihood of any weapons
being shared with terrorists was not high given the absence of evidence linking Iraq to Al
Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In the European view, therefore, delay until period two
had a high, positive option value—information would improve significantly while the
expected costs of conflict, should it occur, were not rising rapidly, if at all.
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E. Multistate Complications: Collective Action and the Security Council
It is worth underscoring that the results above on the possible optimality of
preemptive force turn crucially on the assumption that aggression cannot be deterred by
the mere threat of retaliatory response following an actual "attack" in period two. This
assumption is dubious in many contexts, but may have considerable plausibility with
respect to states that currently (and in the recent past) have become possible targets for
preemptive measures by the United States. North Korea has an erratic government that
cares little about its people. Iran’s government and public have strong religious
motivations. Iraq was a dictatorship with a megalomaniac leader. The Taliban in
Afghanistan was a group of religious zealots who condoned or even encouraged massive
attacks on the West by its terrorist protectees. It is not obvious that threats of retaliation
following an actual attack will dissuade aggression by such governments for the reasons
given earlier, or can dissuade them from embarking on a successful program to obtain
weapons of mass destruction and thereafter making them available to entities who would
use them.
If we are right about the potential importance of this class of problems, the
analysis here raises questions about a legal rule that outlaws preemptive action and limits
the timing of defensive measures to the window after an attack has occurred or become
imminent. The reader might well respond, however, that existing law contains no such
limitation—preemptive measures are permissible if authorized by the U.N. Security
Council. We now turn to an analysis of this and related mechanisms for the collective
authorization of force, preemptive or otherwise.
In our simple model above, we have only two states, Home and Foreign. In the
real world, there are almost 200 states, and the welfare of states not a direct party to
conflict often enters the discussion of its wisdom. In defending the recent invasion
against Iraq, for example, the United States did not confine itself to the argument that the
invasion was necessary to promote its own security. It also argued that the invasion was
necessary to protect other nations in the region and the world.
The introduction of additional states into the analysis raises important new issues.
We treat them informally here in the interests of simplicity.
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The fundamental complication arises because a decision by Home to take action
against Foreign, in either period, creates externalities for third states. Those threatened by
Foreign may reap a benefit from Home's action, and those aligned with Foreign in some
way may suffer a cost. Neighbors of Foreign may also suffer costs due to an influx of
refugees, a loss of trading opportunities, or other collateral consequences of military
conflict.
If Home makes a unilateral decision about military action in either period, and
fails to take full account of these various external effects (as well as the collateral damage
to Foreign), its choices may be distorted from a social standpoint in obvious ways. It may
fail to act preemptively when it is socially optimal because it neglects the benefits to
other states, or it may act preemptively when suboptimal because it neglects the costs. Its
response to an attack in period two, which we do not model in our simple framework but
take to be fixed, can also be distorted by a failure to take account of the costs and benefits
to others. We emphasize that the distortion can run in all directions depending on the
nature and magnitude of the various externalities.
This observation is by no means new. A significant literature exists on the
economics of "alliances," in which a number of states facing a common external threat
must decide how to behave.26 This literature conventionally assumes that defense
measures by one state confer benefits on other threatened states (as did the U.S. nuclear
umbrella for Europe during the Cold War). Not surprisingly, when a state taking
defensive measures bears the full costs, but some of the benefits are external, the result in
(Nash) equilibrium is too little defense effort, a standard result from the theory of public
goods. Of course, if one were to make the opposite assumption that the external effect of
defense measures on other states is predominantly negative, the opposite result could
arise. Finally, and trivially, in cases where conflict between Home and Foreign has no
important external consequences, the analytic treatment in the last section captures all of
the important considerations notwithstanding the existence of other states.
When externalities are important, the international community faces classic
collective action and free rider problems. Four types of highly imperfect "solutions" to
26
The modern economic literature on alliances begins with Mancur Olson & Richard Zeckhauser, An
Economic Theory of Alliances, 48 Rev. Econ. & Stats. 266 (1966). A recent survey of the literature is
Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley, Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action, 39 J. Econ.
Lit. 869 (2001).
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these problems suggest themselves: Coasean bargaining among states in an informal
structure; collective security and alliances; decentralized, hegemonic leadership; and
binding international "law." Consider each in turn.
Informal bargaining. States communicate routinely about matters of mutual
interest, and on issues of significant importance it is not difficult for most states to
ascertain the preferences of other governments. But knowing the preferences of other
states and striking a bargain that solves the externality problem are two different things.
A constructive bargain requires some mechanism that rewards states for the creation of
positive externalities and penalizes them for the creation of negative externalities.
Coasean "bribes" can in principle do both, and can employ various currencies. Monetary
aid is common in some settings, with foreign aid, IMF loans, and the like regularly used
to reward states that behave in accordance with the wishes of major players.27 Even
nations like the United States may be rewarded for taking action in some settings by
commitments of funding to support it (as in the first Gulf war). Where monetary
payments are difficult to orchestrate, "payments" on other issues of interest may be made,
such as trade issues, environmental matters, and so on.
But the problems with informal bargaining in a large numbers situation are both
familiar and potentially acute: negotiation costs, free riders, and bargaining failure. The
process of negotiation is time consuming and costly, and those who benefit from
particular outcomes will hope that others may pay for them. Nations may also act
strategically to demand as much of the surplus as they believe they can extract, and
bargaining can break down as a consequence (recent negotiations between the United
States and Turkey prior to the Iraq invasion may be an illustration). For these reasons,
one cannot be optimistic that informal Coasean bargaining will remedy the externality
problem.
Collective security. One way to reduce some of the costs of informal bargaining is
to structure interaction in a formal institution or alliance. On a global level, the United
Nations was designed to solve the collective action problem as applied to war and peace.
Other institutions aimed at this problem have been devised on a regional level (such as
27
Pakistan provides a good illustration -- since September 11, 2001, Pakistan has cooperated with U.S.
efforts to combat terrorism, and has been rewarded with economic aid and favored military alliance status.
See Afzaal Mahmood, The Non-NATO Ally Status, Hi Pakistan Online, April 1, 2004, available at
http://www.hipakistan.com/en/detail.php?newsId=en58871&F_catID=sd&f_type=source.
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NATO). As originally conceived, the United Nations would have had its own army, and
the Security Council would have directed that army to intervene against states that
threatened the sovereignty of other states. After member states declined to put armies
under international control, it was decided that the Security Council could authorize or
order members to go to war, but member states would retain control of their own
armies.28
These schemes have never worked terribly well. States would not put armies
under international control because they did not trust the United Nations to use their
armies in a way that benefited them. And member states rarely agreed to authorize other
states to go to war because they could not trust the belligerent to act in a way that
benefited them or simply because the war did not serve their own interests. For example,
China and Russia blocked efforts to authorize a United Nations response to Serbia’s
repression of the Kosovars in 1999 because China and Russia would gain nothing from
such a war; they feared setting precedents that would interfere with their own policies in
Tibet and Taiwan (for China) and Chechnya (for Russia); and Russia and Serbia were old
allies. And although China and Russia did not block authorization of the US defense of
Kuwait, they have since learned that this authorization, by giving the US a free hand in
the Persian Gulf, has allowed the US to dominate that region. Many commentators
believe that China and Russia will not repeat this mistake, and that United Nations
authorizations to go to war are not likely to occur again.
Regional alliances are perhaps somewhat more successful, but are hardly without
their imperfections. During the Cold War when U.S. defense measures created substantial
positive externalities for other NATO members, conventional wisdom had it that NATO
members continued to free ride on U.S. defense spending and did not pay a "fair" share of
total costs.29 Further, regional alliances by definition are not global; they may deal with
some externality issues, but will not address all of them.
The essential problem with collective security efforts to date is that the creation of
an institution like the United Nations or NATO does not solve the fundamental problems
that arise in bargaining. These institutions merely provide a venue for bargaining, along

28

See Glennon, supra note __.

29

See Sandler and Hartley, supra note __.
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with voting rules or veto rights that define exit options in the bargaining game. Because
nations have largely proven unwilling to cede significant "sovereignty" to these
institutions, free riding and bargaining failures characterize their normal operation and
they have made at best limited progress in addressing the externalities that motivated
their creation.
These observations cast serious doubt on the adequacy of the U.N. Security
Council as a mechanism for authorizing socially justifiable use of force, whether
preemptive or in any other context. Most threats are targeted at a modest subset of the
U.N. membership. Its members contemplating the use of force will tend to vote their
private interest, and there is little reason to think that Coasean bargaining within the
Security Council will suffice to align their private interest with the social interest. The
voting structure, with five nations holding veto rights, makes it all the more difficult for
the Council to agree on an authorization of force.
Decentralized security and hegemonic leadership. The literature on alliances and
on defense measures as a potential public good notes that larger nations will tend to
supply more defense because their private benefits from defense are greater. A large
nation that becomes dominant in its military position is sometimes termed a hegemon,
and may get its way in matters of international security simply by virtue of its relative
strength.
The perceived failures of the United Nations have led some scholars to argue that
the United States, the most plausible candidate for hegemonic status at present, should
take the lead in solving the problem of collective security.30 One might interpret this
work as suggesting that the United States should adopt the social calculus in its
decisionmaking, but nevertheless stand willing to act unilaterally or with a small
coalition when necessary.
Whatever appeal this suggestion may have in principle, it is far from clear why
the United States would act in this fashion. Political leaders in the United States will be
motivated mainly by national interest groups, and absent Coasean bribes to align the
national and global interest, U.S. policy may be expected to favor the former. To be sure,
situations may arise in which the United States can be compensated for acting in the
30

E.g., Yoo, supra note __.
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broader interest, as in the first Gulf war, but these instances will be plagued by free rider
problems and bargaining failures as indicated above. Any suggestion that the United
States or any other nation ought be allowed to act without constraint as long as it
promises to pursue the global interest, therefore, is not likely to meet with much
enthusiasm in the international community.
International Law. The conventional justification for public international law is
the existence of important international externalities when decisions are made
unilaterally.31 The rules of jus ad bellum may be interpreted as an effort, however
imperfect and weak in its influence, to define the conditions under which the use of force
is socially productive.
A key analytic distinction between collective security institutions on the one
hand, and international law on the other, is that international law can at times be
formulated "behind a veil of ignorance," whereas voting and veto rights in collective
security institutions will typically be exercised only after a specific problem has arisen
and the private interests of members have crystallized.32 For this reason, international law
has the potential to overcome some of the deficiencies in collective security institutions
to the extent that they limit themselves to acting only after crises have arisen. The fact
that the existing international rules of jus ad bellum rely so heavily on voting by a
collective security institution—the Security Council—thus seems somewhat unfortunate.
Yet, the alternatives to reliance on such a collective decisionmaking mechanism
are also problematic. The only obvious option is to create rules that specify the
conditions under which force may be employed, such as the existing rules on self
defense. But the challenge of writing clear and specific rules to anticipate all of the
contingencies under which force may be socially justified is a daunting one, while vague
and general rules will do little work in sorting cases. Further, any system that relies on
generally applicable rules also requires some mechanism to police violations, and hence
the involvement of some type of collective or impartial international body seems
essential (although it could be an entity like the International Court of Justice rather than
the Security Council).

31

See Alan O. Sykes, International Law, forthcoming in Handbook of Law and Economics (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.).
32
We note, however, that nothing in the U.N. charter prevents the Security Council from acting ex
ante, as by promulgating new rules for the use of force before a crisis arises.
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Nevertheless, the analysis in this section and the last suggests that some
consideration might usefully be given to modifying the rules regarding the use of force in
the absence of Security Council authorization. There are good reasons to wonder whether
the Security Council will act to authorize force when it is socially valuable, preemptive
or otherwise, and an important class of cases may exist in which preemptive force can
reduce the social costs of conflict. The requirement of an imminent threat before states
can act in self defense remains troubling for this reason.
We are mindful, however, of some countervailing considerations. First, the
possible justification for preemptive force developed earlier presupposes that "Foreign" is
akin to a criminal actor engaged in unproductive aggression (or potential aggression).
Who is to make the determination that a particular state fits that description? A unilateral
determination by the "hegemon" is subject to the difficulties with hegemonic leadership
noted earlier. And if the determination is entrusted to the Security Council, we return to
square one with the problems of collective security. One might try to fashion objective
criteria as part of the law for the identification of "rogue" states, but that task may be
exceedingly difficult.
Second, and related, rules permitting preemptive force are subject to possible
abuse and opportunism. States may invoke them to justify preemptive attack when it is
socially undesirable, and a mechanism is required to discourage such behavior lest any
modified rules do more harm than good. We will return to these difficult issues below.
F. Humanitarian Intervention
Our simple model can be modified to illustrate the argument for allowing
humanitarian intervention under international law. The use of preemptive force is rarely
required or considered in these cases—intervention occurs (if at all) only after evidence
of an existing humanitarian crisis emerges. We may thus dispense with the two-period
structure, and modify the notation as follows. Let Kh represent the costs to Home of
humanitarian intervention, let Kf represent the collateral damage to foreign from such
intervention, and let Yf represent the costs to Foreign if no intervention occurs. Think of
Yf as the social costs of allowing the humanitarian crisis to play out without intervention.
Humanitarian intervention is then socially justified if:
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Kh + Kf < Yf
Home will again act in accordance with its private calculus rather than the social
calculus. Plainly, if Foreign's welfare does not enter Home's welfare function, Home will
simply decline to act. Why, then, does humanitarian intervention ever occur? One
possibility is that Foreign poses a threat to Home as well as to its own people. The
humanitarian benefits of intervention then arise as a by-product of (or perhaps as a
political justification for) an action to address a threat to Home.
The other possibility is altruism—Home may experience disutility because the
welfare of Foreign does enter its welfare function, and may thus be forced to choose
between the lesser evils of intervention and nonintervention. Suppose, for concreteness,
that Home's private calculus gives the weight α to the welfare of Foreign, where 0 = α =
1. It then chooses to intervene if:
Kh + αKf < αYf
If α=1, the private and social calculus converge. For α<1, however, Home may
decline to intervene when it is socially optimal. And unlike the case of preemptive self
defense considered earlier, there is no danger that home will intervene when intervention
is socially undesirable—if Kh + αKf < αYf, then αKh + αKf < αYf, which implies Kh +
Kf < Yf (intervention is socially optimal).
If altruistic humanitarian intervention when it occurs is socially beneficial, how
do we explain the international resistance to the position that it should be legally
permitted? The answer is that humanitarian goals often serve as a pretext for a military
intervention undertaken for other reasons (for example, territorial expansion). States
rarely act altruistically.33 States spend little money on foreign aid, so why should we
believe them when they claim to invade for the benefit of the citizens of an enemy?
Yet, the pretext problem is not special to humanitarian intervention, as noted
earlier. Self-defense is also a frequent pretext for aggressive war. Thus, we face a puzzle:
If a self-defense exception to the prohibition on war is permitted despite the problem of
pretext, why should a humanitarian exception be denied because of concerns about
pretext?
33

See Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of International Law ch. 9 (forthcoming 2004),
for evidence.
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A possible answer is that the humanitarian justification for intervention is almost
always pretext, while the self defense justification is more often bona fide—perhaps α is
so small as a practical matter that nations will never intervene for genuinely humanitarian
reasons. Indeed, it is difficult to find a single historical example of a war that was clearly
motivated by humanitarian concerns. But one can find examples of intervention
supported by mixed motives, where the humanitarian considerations were arguably
present to a degree.34 And just as other states can decide for themselves whether a selfdefense justification is pretextual or real, so too can they decide whether a humanitarian
justification is pretextual or real. It is thus not obvious why humanitarian intervention
should be prohibited altogether (absent Security Council authorization, which is subject
to its own problems as discussed above).
G. Proportionality
Under the Webster-Ashburton rule of self-defense, the response to the attack must
be “proportional.” The rule came out of a dispute resulting from a conflict along the
Canadian border in 1837.35 Canadian authorities (as agents of the British imperial master)
entered American territory in order to attack camps of Canadian insurgents who were
receiving some aid from locals; several Americans were killed or wounded in the
ensuring melee. The United States protested and after negotiations, the British agreed that
such a use of force could not be justified unless it was proportionate to the (imminent)
threat. The modern version of this idea is that a state cannot use a minor border incursion
or act of violence perpetrated by another state as an excuse for a full scale war.
What is the purpose of the proportionality requirement? In our basic model of two
country conflict, it can perhaps be understood loosely as an injunction to limit the
collateral damage. The larger the threat to Home, the larger the collateral damage may
be; but it remains the case that it should be as small as reasonably possible (implying
some tradeoff between the costs to Home and the costs to Foreign in each period that
needs to be optimized, a consideration outside the framework of our simple model). With
this interpretation, the proportionality requirement is crudely consistent with the social
welfare calculus. Our framework adds only a suggestion that the proportionality
requirement might usefully be interpreted to require proportionality not simply to the
34
35

Compare the discussions in Tesón, supra note __; Franck, supra note __; and Glennon, supra note __.
Lori F. Damrosch et al., International Law: Cases and Materials 922 (4th ed. 2001).
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damage already incurred or imminently threatened, but also to the damage that may be
avoided by preemptive measures.
III. Implications for International Law
A. Self-Defense
Our tentative conclusion is that self-defense should be defined more broadly to
allow preemptive action. A state should be permitted to attack in self-defense even when
the threat is not imminent. We agree with John Yoo that, as a theoretical matter, selfdefense should be permitted when the expected costs of waiting are high enough.36 Thus,
both the probability of the attack and the magnitude of the attack, if it occurs, are relevant
considerations. Using military force to prevent a rogue state from obtaining nuclear
weapons – as Israel did against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility, in 1981 – may be justified.
Similarly, the blockade of Cuba in 1962 could be justified by the threat posed by the
installation of Soviet nuclear weapons.
Our conclusions are more far reaching, however. The model implies that a state
should engage in preemptive war against another state when the costs of waiting for both
states is high enough. Under this new rule, a state can launch a preemptive war against
another state if that other state poses a sufficiently grave threat to the first state’s welfare,
the joint cost of the war is relatively low, and the welfare loss from the threatened attack
would be high for the foreign state as well as for the home state.37 To a surprising degree,
this rule was reflected in the public discussion surrounding the invasion of Iraq by the
United States in 2003.
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See Yoo, supra note __.
This is similar to Yoo’s argument that the old “imminent” self-defense rule fails to take into account
the magnitude of the risk and harm of war. Id. However, although Yoo argues (as we do) that a state should
take account of the expected harm from waiting, he does not say what this expected harm should be
compared with. Here is his discussion (m.s., at 18):
International law should allow states to use force in their self-defense, rather than pursuing
diplomatic means or waiting for the UN to solve the problem, when the expected harm of a
potential attack reaches a certain level. Admittedly, the Hand formula does not inform us where
that line should be, but it does allow us to see that use of force should move away from pure
temporal imminence—which was just a proxy for a high level of probability—to include
probability and magnitude of harm.
By contrast, we argue that the expected harm from an attack should be compared to something: to the
costs (both to Home and Foreign) from initiating a war earlier rather than later.
37
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The Bush administration argued that Iraq would eventually either attack its
neighbors or support terrorist operations against Americans, in either case necessitating
an American military response. Waiting until this time would (1) cause greater casualties
than an immediate attack because in the meantime Saddam would have improved his
WMD capability (Yh > Kh); (2) waiting would also cause greater civilian casualties in
Iraq because a larger response would be necessary (Yf > Kf); further, (3) Iraqi civilians
would in the interim be killed by Saddam’s security forces and the international sanctions
(further increasing Yf); and (4) the probability of eventual Iraqi attack was high (high
p).38 Many critics of the invasion implicitly accepted this normative framework and
merely disagreed about the empirics: they thought, correctly as it turned out, that
Saddam’s WMD capability was low or nil; that sanctions and inspections could prevent
Saddam from improving it; that the short-term costs of war would be higher than
claimed; and that the probability that Saddam would cause trouble in the future was
low.39
There were other differences, of course. Many supporters of the invasion
emphasized the benefits to Iraqis.40 Wilsonians and neoconservatives saw long-term
gains from spreading democracy in the middle east.41 But these differences were more of
a matter of emphasis than about the appropriate legal rule.
A more important challenge to the implicit rule advanced by the Bush
administration came from those who sought United Nations authorization for the war.
These critics argued that the Bush administration should invade Iraq only if it could
persuade the Security Council to authorize the invasion.42
The critics might have been right that the Bush administration should have
obtained United Nations authorization, or at least the support of other major states, as the
38
See, President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html. All of these factors are touched on in
the National Security Strategy of the United States (20002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
39
Various views can be found in Hearings To Examine Threats, Responses, and Regional
Considerations Surrounding Iraq, Hearings, Before The Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, July 31 and August 1, 2002.
40
See, e.g., Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (2002).
41
See, e.g., William Kristol, Lawrence F. Kaplan, The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and
America's Mission (2003).
42
The Bush administration claimed, quite implausibly, that earlier UN resolutions authorized the
invasion. For the arguments pro and con, compare John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97
AJIL 563 (2003), and Thomas M. Franck, The United Nations after Iraq, 97 A.J.I.L. 607 (2003).
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U.S. government did for its intervention in Serbia, but the argument begs the (normative)
question what rule should guide the Security Council’s decision. Currently, there is no
explicit rule governing the circumstances under which the United Nations may authorize
the use of force. The standard view is that the United Nations is not constrained at all,
although there is some dissent.43 Whatever the correct view, our argument is that the
United Nations should authorize the preemptive use of force only when the costs to the
involved states are likely to be less if war occurs sooner rather than later, discounted by
the probability of period 2 war and to present value.
The strongest argument for requiring United Nations authorization of preemptive
force is that a rule allowing the unilateral use of preemptive force may be more easily
manipulated than the traditional imminence rule. The defenders of the old rule argue that
states will use preemptive self-defense as a pretext for launching an invasion for other
purposes – territorial expansion, regional dominance, control of natural resources, and the
like. Imminent threats, by contrast, are so clear that pretextual invasions will be seen for
what they are.
This argument is a kind of rules/standards claim. The preemptive self-defense rule
is a “standard” in the sense that it allows the decisionmaker to consider all normatively
relevant factors. The imminent self-defense rule is a “rule” in the sense that it bars a
normatively justified outcome in order to reduce decision costs, or, in this context, the
cost incurred by other states in discerning the motives of the decisionmaker. The
imminent self-defense rule is preferable if the cost of pretextual wars (enabled by the
preemptive self-defense rule and barred by the imminent self-defense rule) exceeds the
cost of forgone, socially valuable preemptive self-defense (enabled by the preemptive
self-defense rule and barred by the imminent self-defense rule). Should the international
community be more concerned about aggressors masking their motives behind the pretext
of preemptive self-defense44 or rogue states obtaining WMDs and using them?
It is impossible to answer this question with confidence, and we will confine
ourselves to the claim that the preemptive self-defense has become more attractive over
the past 50 years. This is so for three reasons. First, the proliferation of WMDs has
43
One view is that the UN may authorize force only for purposes identified in the UN charter, such as
protection of the territorial integrity of members; another view is that the UN could not authorize force in
violation of jus cogens norms, e.g., to commit genocide.
44
Note that we are talking about the margin: aggressors can already use ordinary self-defense as a
pretext.

27

increased the cost of wars; preemption can now avoid greater losses than it could in the
past.45 Second, decisionmaking processes in most states are more transparent today than
they were during the cold war, when even the western powers refused to engage in public
debate about proposed military interventions. Thus, the pretext problem is somewhat less
severe than in the past. Third, while at one time the imminent self-defense rule may have
been justified by the security council’s residual power to authorize preemptive wars, the
security council system has in the eyes of many proven a failure. It has not authorized a
single preemptive war, and if the security council cannot be depended on to authorize
justified preemptive wars, individual states perhaps ought to have that power.
It is possible that a world hegemon, or dominant regional powers, could assume
some of the functions intended for the United Nations. Some commentators have argued
that there is, or could be, a dual system of international law, one in which the United
States follows one set of rules, and the rest of the world another.46 The argument is that
only the United States can currently serve as an enforcer of international law, because
only the United States has the military capacity to do so. Because the United States incurs
the costs (or most of them), and takes the risks, it should not be subject to the same rules
that apply to other states. This argument lies behind American policy regarding the
International Criminal Court, and its demand that American soldiers and officials enjoy
immunity from the jurisdiction of that court.47
Such a system may be superior to the conventional United Nations system, but
not necessarily. On the one hand, if the hypothetical system better reflects strategic
realities, then compliance is more likely. In addition, as we have seen, the hegemon in
some cases has good incentives to enforce international law. On the other hand, there is
no reason to believe that the hegemon’s incentives are systematically aligned with the
social interest: the hegemon will, absent effective Coasean sidepayments, enforce
international law selectively in a way that reflects its interests.
B. Collective Self-Defense
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Often the use of force is justified as an act of “collective self-defense”: typically,
state A attacks state B because B has attacked C. A recent example is the first Gulf War,
in which the U.S.-led coalition came to the defense of Kuwait. The U.S. assisted
insurgency against Nicaragua in 1980s was justified as a defense of El Salvador and other
neighboring countries, whose own insurgencies were receiving assistance from the
Nicaraguan government. Similar cases, real or pretextual, include U.S. assistance to
South Vietnam and South Korea following attacks from the North.
Collective self-defense is a straightforward extension of individual self-defense. It
allows states to pool their resources, increasing the ability of a weak victim to resist a
strong attacker. However, it raises the pretext problem in a new form. The problem is that
the intervener may use an invasion of a neutral as a pretext for its own ambition.
Nicaragua made this argument in an ICJ case it brought against the United States for
mining its harbors. The ICJ held against the United States, arguing that El Salvador had
failed to notify the United Nations that it sought assistance from the United States This,
according to the ICJ, suggested that the United States was using Nicaragua’s assistance to
the rebels in El Salvador as a pretext for bringing down Nicaragua’s communist
government.48
The ICJ’s decision is puzzling. Either the United States was defending El
Salvador or it was invading Nicaragua. This is purely factual question, although a hard
one. The ICJ should have answered this question, and ruled for the United States in the
first case, or for Nicaragua in the second. Requiring notification might have seemed like
an attractive way of dealing with the pretext problem, but there is little reason to think
that this rule was sensible. If the United States was looking for a pretext, and El Salvador
was compliant, then it would be easy enough for the United States to ask El Salvador to
file the notice ahead of the invasion. In addition, if collective self-defense was genuine,
the ICJ rule, if obeyed, would have prevented nations from obtaining assistance in their
self-defense against foreign enemies because of the failure to comply with a formality.49
This rule is plainly not sustainable, and indeed the United States withdrew in protest from
the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction after the Nicaragua decision was rendered.
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C. Humanitarian Intervention
The United Nations charter does not permit states to use force unilaterally in
order to effect a humanitarian intervention.50 Whether the use of force rules should be
altered to permit humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization again
depends largely on whether the concern about pretext is serious or trivial. If states pay
attention to international law in order to avoid reputational sanctions, and the rest of the
world can distinguish pretextual reasons from actual motives, then the use of force rules
should permit humanitarian intervention. There is no reason why the altruism of a state
should not be permitted to influence its international behavior; a ban on humanitarian
intervention would be as senseless as a ban on foreign aid.
The case for banning humanitarian intervention rests on two assumptions: (1) that
genuine humanitarian motives for invasion are rare; and (2) that a state can escape
reputational sanctions by advancing a pretext for illegal behavior. The first assumption is
probably correct, but should not be exaggerated. And even if the first assumption is
correct, humanitarian intervention should not be banned unless the second assumption is
correct as well. The problem with the second assumption is that there are already plenty
of pretexts (e.g., self-defense, security) for aggressive attacks; it is not clear that
providing aggressive states with a new pretext (humanitarian intervention) would
increase their ability to engage in illegal invasions while avoiding reputational sanctions.
We see little reason for banning humanitarian interventions.
Conclusion
Our main conclusion is that there are good reasons for allowing preemptive selfdefense, quite possibly without Security Council authorization. Although our judgment
on this last point rests on empirical guesses, we can say at least that the strength of the
argument for relaxing the imminence rule has increased with time. The potential
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to rogue states
and state sponsors of terrorism provides a rationale for invading dangerous states sooner
rather than later. That the governments of these states often mistreat their own citizens
50

Id., at 66-67.
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provides an additional reason for preemption. Although one can make a respectable
argument for a regime in which preemptive self-defense can only be employed if
authorized by the United Nations (the status quo), theory and the history of the United
Nations suggest that such a rule may not be adequate because of bargaining failure and
collective action problems. We tentatively suggest, therefore, that the right to unilateral
self-defense should be expanded to include preemptive self-defense.
We note once again that we have restricted our discussion to a subset of the
disputes governed by jus ad bellum, those involving rogue states that threaten socially
unproductive acts of aggression. Our rationale for narrowing the scope of our inquiry in
this way is that the current era – the post-cold war ear beginning around 1990 – seems to
be one in which the likelihood of military conflict between major powers is relatively
low, and many of the security issues that receive prominent attention involve what we
perceive to be rogue states. This situation could change quickly: a war between China
and the U.S. over Taiwan would not fit neatly within our framework; nor would, we
think, a war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. We have no special insights for
such conflicts, and leave them for future research.
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